FACTS: On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV “Jinlian I” 60,000 plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila. The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the unloading of the bags was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.
On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.
On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 35, a Complaint for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC Customs Brokerage.
After the filing of the Answers, trial ensued.
On June 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags, petitioner’s stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the spillage. The RTC, thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles 2176 and 2180 paragraph (4) of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON THE PRESENTATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT IS INDISPENSABLE.
HELD: YES. Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case
Petitioner claims that respondent’s non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy between the respondent and the consignee is fatal to its cause of action.
We do not agree.
First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the issues agreed upon by the parties to be resolved during the pre-trial. As we have said, “the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions, whether during trial or on appeal.” Thus, “[t]he parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. . . . The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to the same.”
Neither was this issue raised on appeal. Basic is the rule that “issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process.”
Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not necessarily fatal. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold that the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not indispensable in this case before the insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its subrogatory right. The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of herein private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim. aSAHCE
The presentation of the insurance policy was necessary in the case of Home Insurance Corporation v. CA (a case cited by petitioner) because the shipment therein (hydraulic engines) passed through several stages with different parties involved in each stage. First, from the shipper to the port of departure; second, from the port of departure to the M/S Oriental Statesman; third, from the M/S Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific Conveyor; fourth, from the M/S Pacific Conveyor to the port of arrival; fifth, from the port of arrival to the arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to the hauler, Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc. (private respondent therein); and lastly, from the hauler to the consignee. We emphasized in that case that in the absence of proof of stipulations to the contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any damage that occurred from the time it received the cargo until it finally delivered it to the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it actually received it. The insurance contract, which was not presented in evidence in that case would have indicated the scope of the insurer’s liability, if any, since no evidence was adduced indicating at what stage in the handling process the damage to the cargo was sustained.
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation, we used the same line of reasoning in upholding the Decision of the CA finding the arrastre contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the insurance company to offer in evidence the insurance contract or policy. We explained:
Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the trial court or even belatedly before the appellate court. InMalayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that the presentation of the marine insurance policy was necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from the very existence of an insurance contract between Malayan Insurance and its consignee, ABB Koppel, even prior to the loss of the shipment. In Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled that the insurance contract must be presented in evidence in order to determine the extent of the coverage. This was also the ruling of the Court in Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on board the petitioner’s vessel, unlike in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to the cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it.
As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioner’s custody. Moreover, there is no issue as regards the provisions of Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation of the contract itself is necessary for perusal, not to mention that its existence was already admitted by petitioner in open court. And even though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.
Judicial notice does not apply
Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01, Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioner’s liability to P5,000.00 per package.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.